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Lethal Injection and the Right of Access: The Intersection of the Eighth and First Amendments 
By: Timothy F. Brown 
 
Introduction 
 The Spring and Summer of 2014 have witnessed renewed debate on the constitutionality 
of the death penalty after a series of high profile legal battles concerning access to lethal 
injection protocols and subsequent questionable executions.  Due to shortages in the drugs 
traditionally used for the lethal injection, States have changed their lethal injection protocols to 
shield information from both the prisoners and the public.  Citing public safety concerns, the 
States refuse to release information concerning the procurement of the drugs to the public.  Such 
obstruction hinders the public’s ability to determine the cruelty of the punishment imposed and 
creates the potential for unconstitutional execution.  Within the coming years, the Supreme Court 
will be faced with deciding the extent of the public’s right of access to government proceedings 
and that right’s effect on lethal injections. 
 The State of Ohio executed Dennis McGuire on January 19, 2014.1  The execution of 
McGuire involved the use of a new drug to administer the lethal injection.2  Rather than the 
traditional three-drug cocktail of sodium thiopental, pancuronum bromide, and potassium 
chloride,3 Ohio opted to use only two drugs: “midazolam, a sedative and anesthetic, and 
hydromorphone, a painkiller and morphine derivative.”4  Officials expected the change of drugs 
would not prolong the typical five-minute execution.5 
                                                 
1 Matt Ford, Can Europe End the Death Penalty in America, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 18, 2014, 7:06 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/02/can-europe-end-the-death-penalty-in-america/283790/. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Lawrence Hummer, I Witnessed Ohio’s Execution of Dennis McGuire. What I Saw Was Inhumane, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2014, 1:51PM) http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/22/ohio-mcguire-
execution-untested-lethal-injection-inhumane. 
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 After strapping McGuire to a gurney, the prison officials inserted an IV into his arm 
before injecting him with the lethal drugs.6  Three minutes into his execution, McGuire told his 
family members present at his execution that he loved them.7  A minute later, his stomach began 
to swell, as if he had a sudden hernia.8  Then for the next eleven minutes, McGuire gurgled as if 
struggling for breath and clenched his fists.9  One witness described McGuire’s death “much like 
a fish lying along the shore puffing for that one gasp of air that would allow it to breathe.”10  
Once the loud breathing sounds subsided, medical technicians listened for a heartbeat for four 
minutes before the warden pronounced McGuire dead.11  All told the typical five minute 
execution took about twenty-five minutes from the time the drugs were injected to the time 
McGuire was pronounced dead.12  An execution scheduled for the next week was postponed by 
Ohio so that the state could reevaluate its lethal injection procedure in light of McGuire’s 
execution.13 
 A week prior to McGuire’s execution, the State of Oklahoma executed Michael Lee 
Wilson.14  Like Ohio, Oklahoma did not use the typical three-drug cocktail for Wilson, 
substituting sodium thiopental for pentobarbital.15  Although he showed no outward signs of 
                                                 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Hummer, supra note 5.   
12 Erica Goode, After a Prolonged Execution in Ohio, Questions over ‘Cruel and Unusual’, NY TIMES (Jan. 17, 
2014) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/18/us/prolonged-execution-prompts-debate-over-death-penalty-
methods.html?hp&_r=0. 
13 Id. 
14 Gary Strauss, Ohio Killer’s Slow Execution Raises Controversy, USA TODAY (Jan. 16, 2014, 8:18PM) 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/16/ohio-killer-executed-with-new-lethal-drug-
combo/4512651/. 
15 Ford, supra note 1. 
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pain, twenty seconds after the administering of the injection, Wilson called out: “I feel my whole 
body burning.”16 
 On July 23, 2014, Arizona executed Joseph R. Wood, III.17  Instead of the typical five to 
ten minute procedure, Mr. Wood’s execution lasted an astonishing hour and fifty-seven 
minutes.18  During the procedure, Mr. Wood coughed, gurgled, and gasped over 600 times for 
air.19  State officials have maintained the appropriateness of the medical procedures involved in 
the execution.20  The initial, physical autopsy of Wood indicated that the IVs were “perfectly 
placed” and “the catheters in each arm were completely within the veins and there was no 
leakage of any kind… anything that was put through the IVs went into the veins.”21  Questions 
remain about the actual drugs used in the proceeding.  Arizona had used the new two-drug 
cocktail of the midazolam and hydromorphone previously used in the McGuire execution.22  
However, execution logs indicate that Wood was actually injected with dosage fifteen times 
more than the dosage required in the most up-to-date Arizona execution protocols.23 
 Common to these recent executions has been the alteration of the typical three-drug 
cocktail due to shortages of the drug sodium thiopental.24  Most of the bulk-suppliers of sodium 
                                                 
16 ASSOCIATED PRESS, ‘I Feel My Whole Body Burning,’ Says Oklahoma Death Row Inmate During Execution, FOX 
NEWS, (Jan. 10, 2014) http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/01/10/feel-my-whole-body-burning-says-oklahoma-death-
row-inmate-during-execution/.  
17 Erik Eckholm, Arizona Takes Nearly 2 Hours to Execute Inmate, NY TIMES (July 23, 2014) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/24/us/arizona-takes-nearly-2-hours-to-execute-inmate.html. 
18 Id. 
19 Michael Kiefer, Reporter Describes Arizona Execution: 2 Hours, 640 Gasps, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC (July 26, 
2014) http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/arizona/politics/2014/07/24/arizona-execution-joseph-wood-
eyewitness/13083637/. 
20 Press Release, Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., Department of Corrections Statement of Review of July 23 Execution (July 
24, 2014) http://www.azcorrections.gov/adc/news/2014/072414_zStatement_review_072314_execution.pdf. 
21 Id. 
22 Eckholm, supra note 17. 
23 Fernanda Santos, Executed Arizona Inmate Got 15 Times Standard Dose, Lawyers Say, NY TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/us/executed-arizona-man-given-15-times-standard-dose-lawyers-say.html. 
24 Dustin Volz, No Drugs, No Executions: Is This the End of the Death Penalty?, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 28, 2013, 
11:13AM) http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/10/no-drugs-no-executions-is-this-the-end-of-the-
death-penalty/280916/. 
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thiopental are companies within the European Union, which openly supports the abolition of the 
death penalty throughout the world.25  In 2011, the EU prohibited the export of sodium 
thiopental to countries that administer lethal injections.26  As a result, the states that administer 
the lethal injection have had to find new means of securing the drugs necessary to carry out the 
sentences.  Some states, such as Missouri, have sought the use of local pharmacists to create a 
compound to use during lethal injections.27  Others have relied upon stockpiled reserves of 
sodium thiopental, which typically has a four-year shelf life.28 
 In the face of this drug shortage, the death penalty states have become increasingly 
secretive about where they have received their drugs.  The states hide behind various statutes and 
regulations that shield the identity of the executioner from the public.  They claim that the 
identity of the drug manufacturer, whether a compounding pharmacy or a pharmaceutical 
company, counts as part of the instrumentalities of the execution.29  To release such information 
could hinder later attempts by the states to acquire more of the drugs due to outside pressures on 
the companies not to do business with the state.30  Accordingly, the states argue that the public 
and the condemned inmate do not have a right to the information. 
 This article does not attempt to argue for the abolition of the death penalty and accepts 
Chief Justice Roberts’ assertion that “[c]apital punishment is constitutional… it necessarily 
follows that there must be a means of carrying it out.”31  However, the constitutionality of capital 
punishment is still governed by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment, which “draw[s] its meaning from evolving standards of decency that mark the 
                                                 
25 Ford, supra note 1. 
26 Id. 
27 Volz, supra note 24. 
28 Ford, supra note 1. 
29 In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d 888, 890 (8th Cir. 2014); see also Schad v. Brewer, No. CV-13-2001-PHX-ROS, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145387 (D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 2013). 
30 In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d at 894. 
31 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 48 (2008) . 
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progress of a maturing society.”32  What this article argues for is increased access to the 
procedures of lethal injection in order to enable the public to have a true understanding of the 
Eighth Amendment and the constitutional boundaries of lethal injections.  By denying the public 
access to all of the information surrounding executions, the states ensure the failure of Justice 
Marshall’s hypothesis that a well-informed public would reject the death penalty.33   
The concept of the informed citizenry has its basis in the First Amendment.34  This article 
will explore the use of the First Amendment as a tool in death penalty litigation.  In particular, it 
will explore the viability of using First Amendment Right of Access jurisprudence to maneuver 
around states’ attempts to limit the information surrounding executions.  A First Amendment 
claim can be helpful in two regards: 1) its success can delay the execution; and 2) it can gain 
information for a subsequent Eighth Amendment claim. 
 Part I recounts the history of capital punishment in the American justice system 
explaining how executions evolved from the very public events involving hangings to the 
secretive affairs involving lethal injection today.  Part II explores the Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, with a particular focus on capital punishment.  The second section 
also considers how the Marshall Hypothesis should guide Eighth Amendment capital punishment 
claims.  Part III of the article focuses on the concept of the First Amendment Right of Access.  
The idea of a public right of access to government proceedings has its roots in the notion that a 
well-informed citizenry is essential for proper regulation of democratic governments.  Part III 
moreover analyzes the way the Supreme Court has interpreted the right of access in cases 
concerning prison inmates.  Part IV describes recent attempts by condemned prisoners to use the 
                                                 
32 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
33 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 232 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
34 Anthony Lewis, A Public Right to Know about Public Institutions: The First Amendment as Sword, 1980 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 3 (1980). 
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First Amendment Right of Access to delay their executions and gather information for potential 
Eighth Amendment violations.   
Finally, the article concludes by arguing that condemned men and women should first 
bring suits based upon the First Amendment prior to any Eighth Amendment claim.  Recent 
decisions have severely limited the use of the Eighth Amendment as a starting point for litigation 
because the inmates often lack the requisite information to make out a valid Eighth Amendment 
claim.35  By bringing a First Amendment claim, the inmate can use the sword aspect of that 
Amendment to gain the information needed to win on a subsequent Eighth Amendment claim.   
Part I 
 One need look only to the early written legal codes to see that the death penalty was an 
entrenched aspect of Western Civilization and its concept of justice.  As the power of the 
centralized state grew, the public execution served as a reminder to the people of the state’s 
ultimate control over the individual’s life.  While many of the first legal codes were concerned 
more with community caretaking, as governmental power became more centralized, executions 
became a means for the state to remind citizens where true power lay: with the sovereign.  The 
early public executions enabled the state to “display the majestic, awesome power of sovereignty 
as it was materialized on the body of the condemned.”36  These early public executions ensured 
that citizens knew their place within society as a whole.  “Executions were designed to make the 
state’s dealing in death majestically visible to all.  Live, but live by the grace of the sovereign; 
live, but remember that your life belongs to the state: these were the messages of the state killing 
of an earlier era.”37  The public aspect of these executions also sought to deter others from 
                                                 
35 In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d at 896. 
36 Austin Sarat, Killing Me Softly: Capital Punishment and the Technologies for Taking Life, in PAIN, DEATH, AND 
THE LAW 49 (Austin Sarat ed., 2001). 
37 Id. at 50. 
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committing the same offense, reminding the viewers of the consequence of trespassing against 
the law.38  
Although various means of execution have existed throughout history, death by hanging 
became the most popular means of public execution within the English system and as such took 
hold in the American colonies.39  Scholars believe that hanging as a form of execution arrived in 
England by way of the invading Germanic tribes of the fifth century C.E.40  Hanging is a simple 
means of execution, one that required little expertise.41  The executioner needed only a length of 
rope to create the noose and a tree from which to hang the rope.42  Upon hoisting the condemned 
up with the rope, gravity set to work as the condemned died from asphyxiation.43   
While hanging provided an easy and accessible means for the state to execute convicts, 
the death penalty in England was not a common sentence until around the Tudor Age.44  William 
the Conqueror, who reigned from 1066-87, used the death sentence rarely, reserving it mostly for 
cases involving treason.45  Nearly five hundred years later during the reign of Henry VIII, 
executions occurred at a rate of no less than two thousand a year.46   
As previously mentioned, executions at this time were extremely public affairs, theater 
for the common folk.47  By the Eighteenth Century, a well-orchestrated display followed the 
conviction of a criminal.  Upon pronouncement of his or her sentence, the condemned was 
                                                 
38 GEORGE RYLEY SCOTT, THE HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 41 (1950). 
39 Ellyde Roko, Note, Executioner Identities: Toward Recognizing a Right to Know Who Is Hiding Beneath the 
Hood ,75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2796 (2007). 
40 TIMOTHY V. KAUFMAN-OSBORN, FROM NOOSE TO NEEDLE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE LATE LIBERAL 
STATE 63 (2002). 
41 Roko, supra note 39 at 2796-97. 
42 Kaufman-Osborn, supra note 40 at 63. 
43 Id. 
44 Scott, supra note 38 at 38. 
45 Id. at 37. 
46 Id. at 38. 
47 Sarat, supra note 36 at 49. 
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executed the subsequent morning, provided the next morning was not a Sunday.48  In London, 
the condemned were originally dragged three miles through the city streets to the place used for 
hangings.49  Often the condemned died along the route as onlookers and passersby hurled refuse 
and beat the condemned, preventing the public from viewing the ultimate spectacle.50  
Consequently, the condemned was placed on an exposed cart as he or she traveled the three 
miles to the site of execution.51  The original site in London consisted of trees from which the 
noose was hung.52  Eventually, a portable scaffold was developed and used at the prison; 
however, the portable scaffold was constructed outside the prison walls for the public to observe 
the execution.53  In 1760, a scaffold with a trapdoor was developed so that when it was triggered, 
the bottom fell away, allowing gravity to pull the condemned down and the noose to suffocate 
the condemned.54  By 1783, executioners had developed a scaffold with a trapdoor which 
permitted the execution of up to ten people simultaneously.55 
Public executions became must-attend events in communities.  People flocked to towns 
for the chance to see an execution.  One early Nineteenth Century contemporary describes 
witnessing the events surrounding an aborted execution in Pennsylvania: 
After the execution of Lechler had gratified the people about York and Lancaster 
with the spectacle of his death, and had produced its proper complement of 
homicide and other crimes, a poor wretch was condemned to suffer the same fate 
in another part of the State of Pennsylvania, where the people had not yet been 
indulged with such a spectacle.  They therefore collected by the thousands and 
tens of thousands.  The victim was brought out.  All the eyes in the living mass 
that surrounded the gibbet were fixed on his countenance, and they waited with 
strong desire, the expected signal for launching him into eternity.  There was a 
delay.  They grew impatient; it was prolonged, and they were outrageous; cries 
                                                 
48 Scott, supra note 38 at 40. 
49 Kaufman-Osborn, supra note 40 at 69. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Scott, supra note 38 at 41. 
53 Kaufman-Osborn, supra note 40 at 76. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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like those which preceded the tardy rising of the curtain in a theater were heard.  
Impatient for delight they expected in seeing a fellow-creature die, they raised a 
ferocious cry.  But, it was at last announced that a reprieve had left them no hope 
of witnessing his agonies, their fury knew no bounds; and the poor maniac—for it 
was discovered that he was insane—was with difficulty snatched by the officers 
of justice from the fate which the most violent among them seemed determined to 
inflict.  This most awful and humiliating instance of the degrading depth to which 
human nature may descend, occurred at a place called Orwigsburgh, in 
Pennsylvania, and Mr. Livingston declares the picture by no means overcharged, 
the name of the rescued maniac was Zimmerman.56 
 
At the last public execution in Philadelphia in 1837, an estimated 20,000 people attended with 
the hope of seeing James Moran hang.57 
 The first half of the Nineteenth Century witnessed the formation of a number of reform 
movements in the United States, including the death penalty abolition movement.  Growing out 
of the prison reform movement, the abolitionists believed the death penalty to be another 
example of inhume treatment of prisoners.58  The first major victory for the abolitionists 
occurred in 1847 when Michigan became the first state to abandon the use of capital 
punishment.59   
 As death penalty abolitionists began to gain momentum, proponents for the death penalty 
sought to remove the public aspect of the sentence.  States began to pass private execution laws 
in which the execution would occur within the prison walls in the presence of a selected group of 
witnesses.60  Abolitionists opposed these measures because they believed that if executions took 
place in private, the public would not understand fully the consequences of a death sentence.61  
The great social reformer Horace Greely believed that private executions “subtracted much of 
                                                 
56 Scott, supra note 38 at 54. 
57 John D. Bessler, Televised Executions and the Constitution: Recognizing a First Amendment Right of Access to 
State Executions, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 355, 359 (1993). 
58 Nicholas Levi, Note, Veil of Secrecy: Public Executions, Limitations on Reporting Capital Punishment, and the 
Content-Based Nature of Private Execution Laws, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 131, 136 (2002). 
59 Scott, supra note 38 at 72. 
60 Bessler, supra note 57 at 362. 
61 Id. at 361. 
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the force” from the abolitionist cause.62  Nevertheless, in 1833, Rhode Island became the first 
state to enact a private execution law.63  By 1849, when Michigan had abolished the death 
penalty, fifteen states had enacted private execution statutes.64  The passage of the private 
execution laws did not completely eliminate public executions.  Executions were a local affair 
governed in many states by the local county sheriff.65  It was not until state governments took 
control from the county sheriffs in the early Twentieth Century that public executions faded into 
history.66  The last recorded public execution occurred on May 21, 1937 in the town of Galena, 
Missouri.67 
 The latter half of the Nineteenth Century saw a movement to find more humane means to 
execute prisoners.  Wilkerson v. Utah,68 one of the first challenges to capital punishment heard 
by the Supreme Court, upheld the use of a firing squad to execute a man convicted of first degree 
murder.  While recognizing the limits imposed by the Eighth Amendment, the Court found “that 
the punishment of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for the crime of murder in 
the first degree is not included” in the ban on cruel and unusual punishments.69  The use of a 
firing squad, however, is more of an outlier among execution methods as hanging remained the 
more popular method.70 
In 1885, New York authorized a commission to discover “whether the science of the 
present day” could not find a less barbaric means to execute prisoners.  After a thorough two-
year study, which considered every known method of execution, the commission suggested the 
                                                 
62 Levi, supra note 58 at 141. 
63 Id. at 139. 
64 Id. at 140. 
65 Bessler, supra note 57 at 363. 
66 Id. at 365. 
67 Id. 
68 99 U.S. 130 (1878). 
69 Id. at 134-35. 
70 Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 63 (2007). 
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use of the electric chair.71  The commission had considered the possibility of using some form of 
lethal injection, but decided the procedure was impractical.72  “[T]he medical profession strongly 
opposed the use of the hypodermic needle for executions, fearing that the public would associate 
the practice of medicine with death.”73  In 1890, after the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the use 
of the electric chair,74 William Kemmler became the first condemned prisoner to die by the 
electric chair.75  After his execution, the electric chair gained acceptance as a humane means of 
executing prisoners.  By 1913, fifteen states had adopted the electric chair as the primary method 
of execution.76  By 1949, the total number of states authorizing the use of the electric chair had 
increased to twenty-six.77 
Unlike hanging, which at its most rudimentary form required a rope and a tree, the 
electric chair required more skill from the executioner to carry out the procedure.  Mainly the 
executioner needed familiarity with electricity.78  A contemporary newspaper account described 
the method by which the electrical current would flow into Mr. Kemmler’s body: 
Then come two switches, one for short circuiting the current, the other the fatal 
switch which carries the current to the wires connecting with the body of the 
condemned man.  Two wires at the top connect with a dynamo 1,000 feet away in 
the north wing of the prison.  One of the wires at the bottom will be connected 
with the metal cap to be worn on the head and the other will be adjusted to the 
base of Kemmler’s spine.79  
 
                                                 
71 Id. 
72 Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. REV. 319, 373 (1997). 
73 Id. 
74 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890). 
75 Denno, supra note 70 at 62. 
76 Denno, supra note 72 at 365. 
77 Id. 
78 Roko, supra note 39 at 2797. 
79 Associated Press, Kemmler’s Death Chamber: How the Electric Current Is To Be Transmitted To His Body, N.Y.. 
TIMES, April 26, 1890,  http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=F50E1FF73E5F10738DDDAF0A94DC405B8085F0D3. 
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The medical report of the first execution by electricity asserted: “the important fact remains that 
unconsciousness was instantly effected, and death was painless.”80  The report also lauded the 
humaneness of execution by electricity in contrast to hanging: 
Compared with hanging, in which death is frequently produced by strangulation, 
with every indication of conscious suffering for an appreciable time on the part of 
the victim, execution by electricity is infinitely preferable, both as regards the 
suddenness with which death is effected and the expedition with which all the 
immediate preliminary details may be arranged.  By the latter method the fatal 
stroke renders its victim unconscious in an infinitesimal fraction of a second, so 
small as to be beyond the power of the human mind to estimate, while, at the 
same time, it disintegrates the nerve tissues and blood to an extent which insures 
an absoluteness of death in a shorter space of time than is possible by any other 
known method.  In other words, it is the surest, quickest, most efficient, and least 
painful method that has yet been devised.81 
 
Despite these accolades for execution by electricity, the author of the report, Dr. C.E. Spitzka, 
preferred the guillotine as a primary means of execution.82 
 The next advance in execution technology involved the adoption of lethal gas.  In 1921, 
Nevada became the first state to adopt lethal gas execution and end executions by hanging and 
firing squad.83  Although lethal gas never surpassed the electric chair in popularity, by 1955 
eleven states used lethal gas as their execution of choice.84  The promotion of lethal gas was 
short lived.  By 1994, states no longer viewed the gas chamber as an acceptable means of 
execution.85 
 In the aftermath of Gregg v. Georgia86 which reopened the death penalty after a four year 
moratorium, states looked to technological advances yet again to find a more humane execution 
                                                 
80 Killing by Electricity: Official Story of the Execution of Kemmler, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 9, 1890, 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F10711FE3A5F10738DDDA00894D8415B8085F0D3. 
81 Id. 
82 The Kemmler Execution: Dr. C.E. Spitzka Tells Doctors and Lawyers All About It, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1890, 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=FB0B13F63A5F10738DDDA80994D9415B8085F0D3. 
83 Denno, supra note 72 at 366 
84 Id. at 367. 
85 Id. 
86 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
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method.87  States settled on execution by lethal injection because of the proposed humane and 
economic benefits of the method.88  The first state to authorize lethal injection as a form of 
execution was Oklahoma in 1977.89  By 1982, when the first execution by lethal injection was 
performed, five states had adopted the method.90  As of 2013, lethal injection is the primary 
method of execution in thirty-five states in addition to the United States military and the federal 
government.91 
 As states passed legislation authorizing lethal injection, they faced the problem of finding 
executioners with enough medical training to carry out the procedure.  The medical profession 
openly opposed doctor participation in lethal injection and threatened sanctions against members 
who participated.92  When New Jersey authorized lethal injection, the state hired Fred A. 
Leuchter, Jr. to construct a lethal injection machine that would remove the need for medical 
specialists in administering the drug.93  Leuchter was not himself a medical expert, but self-
taught in the intricacies of “the execution business” after entering the “business” in 1979.94  
Leuchter advised sixteen states on execution equipment and sold his lethal injection machine for 
an estimated $25,000 to four states—Illinois, Delaware, Missouri, and New Jersey.95  In late 
1990, information surfaced that Leuchter held a bachelor’s degree in history and was not a 
                                                 
87 Denno, supra note 72 at 374. 
88 Id. 
89 Denno, supra note 70 at 65. 
90 Denno, supra note 72 at 375. 
91 Methods of Execution, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/methods-execution (last 
visited April 14, 2014). 
92 Id. 
93 Kaufman-Osborn, supra note 40 at 181. 
94 Michael deCourcy Hinds, Making Execution Humane (or Can It Be?), N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1990, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/13/us/making-execution-humane-or-can-it-
be.html?action=click&module=Search&region=searchResults&pagewanted=2. 
95 Id. 
14 
 
licensed engineer.96  Massachusetts charged Leuchter “with fraudulently practicing engineering,” 
to which he pled guilty.97 
 States often leave the specifics of the actual lethal injection protocol to the discretion of 
the prison administration.  Wyoming’s lethal injection statute provides information meant to 
guide corrections officials during the execution by listing the types of permitted drugs for the 
injection.98  In contrast, South Dakota has left much of the decision to the warden for how to 
administer the lethal injection.99  For the most part, states are hesitant to release all information 
about the execution protocols unless faced with litigation.100  The states will often cite fears of 
prison security and the need to protect drug manufacturers from potential harassment from 
abolitionist groups.101  While the states may differ on the minute details, the traditional lethal 
injection consisted of a three-drug cocktail: first sodium thiopental, next pancuronium bromide, 
and finally potassium chloride.102  Chief Justice Roberts explained the effects of the drugs: 
The first drug, sodium thiopental… is a fast-acting barbiturate sedative that 
induces a deep, comalike unconsciousness when given in the amounts used for 
lethal injections… The second drug, pancuronium bromide… is a paralytic agent 
that inhibits all muscular-skeletal movements and, by paralyzing the diaphragm, 
stops respiration… Potassium chloride, the third drug, interferes with the 
electrical signals that stimulate the contractions of the heart, inducing cardiac 
arrest…  The proper administration of the first drug ensures that the prisoner does 
not experience any pain associated with the paralysis and cardiac arrest caused by 
the second and third drugs.103 
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Once the condemned inmate is led into the execution chamber, the executioners fasten him or her 
“to a gurney… insert a catheter into a vein, and inject a nonlethal solution.  After the reading of a 
death warrant, a lethal mixture is injected by one or more executioners or, depending upon the 
state, by a machine.”104  From the first administration of the sodium thiopental, the execution 
should last around five minutes.105 
 Recently, states have had to reconsider the three-drug cocktail due to shortages of the 
first drug—sodium thiopental.  Hospira, the only U.S. manufacturer of sodium thiopental, 
stopped production of the drug in 2011 because it opposed the use of the drug in executions.106  
When states attempted to switch to pentobarbital as a substitute, the only American licensed 
maker of the drug, the Danish company Lundbeck, Inc., announced a new distribution system of 
the drug designed to keep the drug out of the execution chamber.107  By the end of 2011, the 
European Union banned the export of “‘products which could be used for the execution of 
human beings by means of lethal injection,’ including ‘short and intermediate acting barbiturate 
anesthetic agents’ like pentobarbital and sodium thiopental.”108  In response to the shortage of 
sodium thiopental, Missouri considered using the drug propofol as a substitute because of its 
similar qualities to sodium thiopental.109  Unlike sodium thiopental, which is no longer a widely 
accepted anesthetic in the medical community,110 propofol is still used by doctors for medical 
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procedures.111  However, Missouri decided not to pursue that avenue because of fears propofol 
would suffer the same fate from the European Union as sodium thiopental.112  
 States have also looked to new drug combinations in an effort to find alternatives to the 
traditional three-drug lethal injection.  Ohio, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Florida have begun to use 
a two-drug combination of “hydromorphone, an opioid painkiller that suppresses breathing, and 
midazolam, a sedative.”113  However, the States differ in regards to the actual dosage 
administered during the execution.  Florida uses 500 milligrams of midazolam and Oklahoma 
uses 100 milligrams.114  Ohio’s and Arizona’s protocols call for 50 milligrams of the drug.115  
Texas uses only one drug for lethal injection purposes: pentobarbital.116 
 The recent drug shortage has had tangible effects on state policies.  First, as is the case 
when supply is limited and the demand great, states have faced increased costs for the execution 
drugs.117  Second and of more importance, states have begun to use compounding pharmacies to 
supply the drugs needed for lethal injections.118  When using the compounding pharmacies, the 
states sought the help of laws protecting the identity of members of the execution team, arguing 
that the compounding pharmacies are members of the execution team.119  By denying access to 
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information concerning the drug manufacturers, the states have transformed the execution from a 
public event demonstrating the power of the state to uphold the community’s sense of justice to a 
completely private and secretive event, hiding from the public one of the most tremendous 
powers of the state—the power over life and death. 
 The recent shortages have also led some states to take questionable methods to acquire 
the necessary drugs.  In 2011, the Drug Enforcement Administration seized Georgia’s cache of 
sodium thiopental.120  Federal authorities were concerned with the legality of the importation of 
the drug from the United Kingdom.121  Georgia bought the drugs from the British company 
Dream Pharma, which apparently “operated out of the back of a London driving school.”122  In 
response to the importation problems, the Food and Drug Administration declared that “in 
‘defer[ence] to law enforcement’ agencies, henceforth it would exercise its ‘enforcement 
discretion not to review [shipments of sodium thiopental] and allow processing through 
[Customs’] automated system for importation.’”123  Death row inmates from Arizona, California, 
and Tennessee sued the FDA for violating the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act124 when it failed to 
sample and examine imported misbranded sodium thiopental for use in lethal injections.125  The 
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia upheld a district court order requiring the FDA to 
enforce the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act but vacated the order requiring the FDA to seize the 
drugs already held by the states because the states were not a named party to the suit.126  In 
particular, the DC Circuit found the FDA was required to: 
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(1) sample “any drugs” that have been “manufactured, prepared propagated, 
compounded, or processed” in an unregistered establishment and (2) examine the 
samples and determine whether any “appears” to violate the prohibitions listed in 
§ 381(a)(1)-(3).  If, “from the examination of such samples or otherwise,’ the 
FDA finds an apparent violation of the Act, then it must (3) “refuse[ ] admission” 
to the prohibited drug.127 
 
 As foreign markets to acquire the drugs have dried up, states have become increasingly 
hesitant to release any information about how they have obtained the drugs.   Recent federal 
cases such as Landrigan v. Brewer,128 In re Lombardi,129 and Schad v. Brewer130 show how far 
the states are willing to go in order to limit access to information regarding lethal injection drugs.  
In particular, the states have attempted, with varying success, to deny access to the name of the 
manufacturer and how the state acquired the drug.131  As will be discussed in subsequent 
sections, the information concerning the drugs is vital for the defendant seeking to make a valid 
Eighth Amendment claim.  By denying access to the information, the states have forced defense 
lawyers to find new arrows for their quiver of legal arguments and pushed Eighth Amendment 
“cruel and unusual punishment” litigation towards the realm of First Amendment Right of 
Access. 
Part II 
 An analysis of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning capital punishment starts 
with the language of the Eighth Amendment.  The text provides: “Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”132  Of 
particular interest, the ban on “cruel and unusual punishments” has been the crux of all 
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arguments concerning the death penalty.133  The addition of the phrase to the Amendment, 
however, was viewed as “constitutional boilerplate” and generated little debate during 
ratification.134  The phrase “cruel and unusual punishment” comes word-for-word from the 
English Bill of Rights, adopted after the Glorious Revolution in 1689.135  While the language 
appears on its face fairly straight forward, the Supreme Court’s definition and understanding of 
“cruel and unusual” has evolved over time. 
 One of the first Supreme Court cases to deal with the “cruel and unusual punishment” 
clause was Wilkerson v. Utah.136  A jury convicted Wilkerson of first degree murder.137  
Subsequently, the trial judge sentenced him to “be publicly shout [sic] until [he is] dead.”138  
Wilkerson challenged the use of a firing squad.  At the time, federal law had limited the 
sentencing power of federal courts to imposing death by hanging only.139  The Utah Territory 
had enacted legislation in 1852 which authorized execution by firing squad, hanging, or 
beheading.140  In 1876, the territorial legislature passed a new statute that punished first degree 
murder with death but did not prescribe the means of execution from which the judge was to 
choose.  Wilkerson attempted to argue that the limits placed on federal judges superseded state 
methods.141  The Court rejected that argument by noting that traditionally capital punishment has 
been carried out in courts-martial by either shooting or hanging.142  Next, the Court addressed 
concerns about the constitutionality of shooting under the Eighth Amendment.  While attempting 
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to outline “cruel and unusual,” the Court noted that “[d]ifficulty would attend the effort to define 
with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual 
punishments shall not be inflicted.”143  At a minimum, punishments of torture that are 
unnecessarily cruel, such as being hanged, drawn, and quartered, are not permitted under the 
Eighth Amendment.144  The Court held that the sentencing judge was within his power to 
sentence Wilkerson to death by firing squad because the sentence did not pass over to the realm 
of cruel and unusual.145  One should note the importance the Court placed upon the military’s use 
of a firing squad to justify imposing the same sentence on Wilkerson.  The Court implicitly 
looked to what society deemed an appropriate method of execution, finding justification in its 
use by the military. 
 A few years after deciding on the constitutionality of the firing squad, the Court 
determined for the first time the constitutionality of the electric chair.  In re Kemmler146  
involved New York State’s attempt to become the first state to execute a man by electricity.  
William Kemmler had been sentenced to death for the murder of Matilda Zeigler.147  Kemmler 
put forth a simple argument that the use of electricity for his execution violated the prohibition of 
“cruel and unusual” punishment.148  The lower courts deferred to the judgments of the New York 
legislature that had determined “that the use of electricity as an agency for producing death 
constituted a more humane method of executing the judgment of the court in capital cases.”149  
Building off of the definition used in Wilkerson, the Court went on to describe the parameters of 
the “cruel and unusual” clause:  
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Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the 
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the 
Constitution.  It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more 
than the mere extinguishment of life.150 
 
Ultimately, the Court upheld New York’s statute authorizing the electric chair under a highly 
deferential standard toward both the state legislature and the state courts.151  The Court reasoned 
that the legislature had apprised itself of all of the facts necessary to determine that the electric 
chair consisted of a humane mode of execution.152  By relying on the legislative findings of the 
New York legislature, the Court gave a nod towards the use of social mores as a means for 
defining “cruel and unusual” punishment.  Indeed, the stimulus for using the electric chair grew 
out of a belief that hanging was a barbarous relic of the Dark Ages.153  “Cruel and unusual,” 
therefore, could change based upon legislative findings. 
 The next two cases of significance in terms of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence actually 
did not involve the death penalty.  The first case, Weems v. United States,154 involved a case 
arising from the then-United States Territory of the Philippine Islands.  Weems, a member of the 
Coast Guard, had falsified public documents in order to embezzle government funds.155  Upon 
his conviction, Weems was sentenced to a minimum of “confinement in a penal institution for 
twelve years and one day, a chain at the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard and painful labor, 
no assistance from friend or relative, no marital authority or parental rights or rights or 
property…”156  Weems argued that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment.157  
After discussing the nature of the punishment, the Court asserted that a cornerstone of the 
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American penal system “is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated 
and proportioned to offense.”158  The Court attempted to give deference to the penalty because 
the legislature had duly enacted the statute authorizing the penalty.159  However, the Court could 
not reconcile the statute with the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.160  
Weems demonstrates the Supreme Court’s first steps towards accepting the concept of 
proportionality within the definition of “cruel and unusual.” 
 The second case not to involve the death penalty was Trop v. Dulles in which the Court 
declared unconstitutional a statute that authorized the denationalization of convicted military 
deserters.161  While serving as a private in the Army during World War II, Trop was confined to 
a stockade in Casablanca.162  Trop escaped but returned the next day.163  A court-martial 
convicted him of desertion and “sentenced him to three years of hard labor, forfeiture of all pay 
and allowances and a dishonorable discharge.”164  In addition, he was stripped of his status as an 
American citizen.165  After the war, upon denial of a passport application, Trop challenged the 
last aspect of his sentence.166  After declaring the authorizing statute penal in nature, the Court 
analyzed the denationalization of Trop in light of the Eighth Amendment.167  Although desertion 
during time of war is punishable by death, the Court stated that “the existence of the death 
penalty is not a license to the Government to devise any punishment short of death within the 
limit of its imagination.”168  On the contrary, the Court used the opportunity presented by Trop’s 
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case to add more defined boundaries to the ambiguity present in the Eighth Amendment.  The 
Court stated: 
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the 
dignity of man.  While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands 
to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.  
Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be imposed depending upon the 
enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the bounds of these traditional 
penalties is constitutionally suspect.169 
 
Here, the Court fully embraced the concept of proportionality in determining the constitutionality 
of a punishment, but couches the terms in ensuring humane punishment.  The Court further 
declared that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”170  The definition of cruel and unusual 
punishment changes as the values of society evolves.  In adopting this view, the Court embraced 
the ambiguity in attempting to define the Seventeenth Century phrase in terms of, what was at 
that point, Twentieth Century life.   
One should also note in particular that the Court rejected denationalization because “[t]he 
civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as 
punishment for crime.”171  Not only will the Court consider the American people’s standard of 
decency when considering the Eighth Amendment, but the Court made clear that the Court will 
also consider the opinions from other countries.  In so doing, the Court gave the Eighth 
Amendment a universal aspect to it.  Rooted in the dignity of men, the Amendment nevertheless 
is not stagnant because society changes its definition of cruel and unusual.  At the same time, the 
definition of dignity of men cannot be limited to the singular American outlook.  The Court 
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recognized that the concept of human dignity transcends national borders, requiring comparison 
in order for the country to judge properly its ever changing social mores. 
 In 1972, the Supreme Court issued a fractured decision that for the first time called into 
question the validity of the death penalty as a means of punishment.  Furman v. Georgia172 
contained a concise per curium opinion that held that “the imposition and carrying out of the 
death penalty in [the underlying cases] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments.”173  Nine separate opinions followed the five-four 
decision.  Of the five judges who concurred with the decision only two held capital punishment 
to constitute cruel and unusual punishment: Justices Brennan and Marshall.  The other three 
concurring justices held that the imposition of capital punishment unconstitutional as currently 
instituted, leaving the door open for a constitutionally acceptable system by which a state could 
impose the death penalty. 
 Of the various opinions within Furman v. Georgia, Justice Marshall’s presents an 
interesting theory on public support for capital punishment.  In what has become known as the 
“Marshall Hypothesis,”174 Justice Marshall contended that Americans would reject capital 
punishment if they knew all of the facts surrounding its application.175  Before introducing his 
theory on public attitudes on capital punishment, Justice Marshall provided a history of the 
formation of the “cruel and unusual” clause and the Court’s interpretation.176  Justice Marshall 
then discussed of the constitutionality of capital punishment by downplaying past decisions on 
the legitimacy of capital punishment:   
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The fact, therefore, that the Court, or individual Justices, may have in the past 
expressed an opinion that the death penalty is constitutional is not now binding on 
us…  There is no holding directly on point, and the very nature of the Eighth 
Amendment would dictate that unless a very recent decision existed, stare decisis 
would bow to changing values, and the question of the constitutionality of capital 
punishment at a given moment would remain open.177 
 
For Justice Marshall, because the interpretation of the “cruel and unusual punishment” clause 
relies upon the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,”178 
current public perception of “cruel and unusual” outweighs any prior Court decision.   
 In order to guide his analysis on the constitutionality of the death penalty, Justice 
Marshall put forth four reasons for finding a punishment unconstitutional, similar to those 
advocated by Justice Brennan.179  In the first category, Justice Marshall placed “punishments that 
inherently involve so much physical pain and suffering that civilized people cannot tolerate 
them,” which at the time of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment were outlawed.180  Next, 
Justice Marshall identified “punishments that are unusual, signifying that they were previously 
unknown as penalties for a given offense.”181  The third category comprised penalties that are 
“excessive and serve[] no valid legislative purpose”182 because “[t]he entire thrust of the Eighth 
Amendment is… against that which is excessive.”183  The fourth and final category consisted of 
punishments invalidated because “popular sentiment abhors it.”184  Since capital punishment had 
enjoyed validity since the founding of the country, Justice Marshall focused his inquiry on 
whether capital punishment fell within one of his two remaining categories.185  Eventually, 
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Justice Marshall concluded that the death penalty does not serve a valid penological purpose and 
in fact “is an excessive and unnecessary punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment.”186 
 Justice Marshall continued his analysis by discussing public opinion of capital 
punishment.  A proper gauge of the public’s opinion on the death penalty requires the public to 
know all of the information surrounding it:  
…[T]he question with which we must deal is not whether a substantial portion of 
American citizens would today, if polled, opine that capital punishment is 
barbarously cruel, but whether they would find it to be so in the light of all 
information presently available.187 
 
Justice Marshall recognized that the public has very little information concerning capital 
punishment and would seem to base most of its ideas concerning capital punishment on a 
perceived need for retribution.188  Justice Marshall pointed to the great depth of discrimination in 
the death penalty’s application—against minorities, the poor, even based upon gender.189  
Moreover, the public fails to recognize that the death penalty’s finality has led to the deaths of 
people later discovered to be innocent.190  Finally, the public does not know the effect the death 
penalty has on the legal system as a whole by sensationalizing crimes and serves as an 
impediment for prison reform.191  If the public had knowledge of the flaws inherent in capital 
punishment, Justice Marshall believed the public would “find it shocking to [its] conscience and 
sense of justice.”192 
 Justice Marshall’s theory assumes the public has complete access to all the information 
surrounding capital punishment and if the public lacks immediate access, the government would 
willingly provide all of the information.  In order for the average citizen to become enlightened 
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as to the cruel and unusual elements of the death penalty, the government must share the 
information with him.  Otherwise, the public remains ignorant, relying on its “desire for 
retribution.”193  If the definition of the “cruel and unusual punishment” clause relies upon 
society’s evolving standards of decency, and as Justice Marshall suggests, complete information 
on all aspects of the death penalty helps society develop its standards of decency, then public 
access to information concerning the death penalty becomes key to the evolution of the definition 
of cruel and unusual.  By limiting access to information concerning the death penalty, the 
government stems the evolving definition of cruel and unusual punishment, keeping a supposed 
fluid standard at a particular moment in time perhaps no longer applicable. 
 The end of the death penalty in the United States lasted until the Court decided Gregg v. 
Georgia194 four years later.  Another fractured decision, Justice Stewart announced the decision 
for the court which upheld Georgia’s reworked death penalty statute which created a bifurcated 
jury process for deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty.195  Unlike Justice Marshall, 
Justice Stewart found guidance in past decisions which focused on the method used to execute 
the prisoner rather than the constitutionality of the death penalty as a whole.196  Although Justice 
Stewart accepted the evolving nature of the Eighth Amendment, he did not apply it to the 
punishment of death, but limited its application to the method.197  Still, Justice Stewart applied a 
two part test: “First, the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain.  Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the 
crime.”198  Nevertheless, the Court must defer to the decisions of the legislature:   
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We may not require the legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so 
long as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the 
crime involved.  And a heavy burden rests on those who would attack the 
judgment of the representatives of the people.199 
 
As representatives of the people, the legislature stands in a good position to know the public’s 
opinion of the death penalty.  The Court also looked to the history of the United States and found 
the imposition of the death penalty since the country’s beginning.200  Moreover, the concerns of 
the death penalty’s discriminatory application can be rectified through “a carefully drafted statute 
that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance.”201  Justice 
Stewart’s deference to the legislature and reliance on history limits the definition of “cruel and 
unusual” in a way that does not question the sentence but only the method for imposing the 
sentence.  The death penalty itself, because of its historical acceptance, does not face scrutiny 
under the evolving standards of decency.    
 Justice Marshall’s dissent in Gregg reiterated his position in Furman.  For Justice 
Marshall, the enactment of new death penalty legislation post-Furman does not indicate public 
support.202  Once again, the crux of Justice Marshall’s argument lies with the need for the public 
to have all the information about the death penalty:  “But if constitutionality of the death penalty 
turns, as I have urged, on the opinion of an informed citizenry, then even the enactment of new 
death statutes cannot be viewed as conclusive.”203  Citing a study about public perception of the 
death penalty after the enactment of the new statutes, Justice Marshall argued that the average 
citizen still lacked full information about capital punishment.204  Similarly, Justice Marshall 
                                                 
199 Id. at 174. 
200 Id. at 177. 
201 Id. at 195. 
202 Id. at 232. 
203 Id. (emphasis original) 
204 Id.  
29 
 
questioned the need for the death penalty when an alternative—life imprisonment—exists.205  
Finally, Justice Marshall criticized what he saw as a punishment based solely on retribution.206  
Once again, Justice Marshall focused on the ignorance of the public in forming its opinion.  
Information would conceivably create a vocal majority against the death penalty within the 
country. 
 In the years subsequent to Gregg v. Georgia, the Court accepted the basic premise of the 
death penalty as constitutional, but limited its application to certain procedures and toward 
certain classes of offenders.  The Burger Court “indicated that states may enact capital statutes 
provided that application is limited to clearly defined classes of murder, and that due process 
requirements have been followed.”207  An early case during the Rehnquist Court explained the 
state of Eighth Amendment with regards to capital punishment: 
First, there is a required threshold below which the death penalty cannot be 
imposed.  In this context, the State must establish rational criteria that narrow the 
decision maker’s judgment as to whether the circumstances of a particular 
defendant’s case meet the threshold.  Moreover, a societal consensus that the 
death penalty is disproportionate to a particular offense prevents a State from 
imposing the death penalty for that offense.  Second, States cannot limit the 
sentencer’s consideration of any relevant circumstances that could cause it to 
decline to impose the penalty.  In this respect, the State cannot channel the 
sentencer’s discretion, but must allow it to consider any relevant information 
offered by the defendant.208 
 
This analysis shifts the focus from the constitutionality of the death penalty itself to the 
application of the death penalty.  While societal attitudes may change and impact how to 
administer the death penalty, society’s attitude toward the punishment itself, on a general scale, 
does not matter.  Post-Gregg, the Court limited the application of the death penalty, striking 
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down its use as a punishment for rape of an adult woman209 as well as the rape of a minor;210 
declaring the execution of mentally retarded offenders unconstitutional;211 and barring the 
execution of offenders who committed their offense while still a minor.212  In each decision, the 
Court envisioned the Eighth Amendment as allowing the death penalty but with specific 
limitations for its use. 
 More recently, in Baze v. Rees,213 the Court addressed the constitutionality of a particular 
method for executing an offender.  Death row inmates from Kentucky challenged the 
constitutionality of the state’s lethal injection protocol.214  The inmates contended that “because 
of the risk that the protocol’s terms might not be properly followed, resulting in significant pain” 
the procedures violated the Eighth Amendment.215  Ultimately, the Court rejected the petitioner’s 
claims.  Writing for a plurality, Chief Justice Roberts addressed the general proposition of capital 
punishment: 
Capital punishment is constitutional… it necessarily follows that there must be a 
means of carrying it out.  Some risk of pain is inherent in any method of 
execution—no matter how humane—if only from the prospect of error in 
following the required procedure.  It is clear, then that the Constitution does not 
demand the avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out executions.216   
 
Once again, the inquiry accepts the constitutionality of the death penalty, leaving in dispute only 
the method through which to challenge the sentence.  Here, the inmates tried to have Kentucky’s 
method declared “cruel and unusual” by comparing it to a proposed method with less of a risk 
for mishap and resulting pain.217  The plurality rejected this argument.  The possibility of pain 
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does not rise to the level of “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment; the Amendment 
bars “wanton exposure to objectively intolerable risk.”218  Instead, Chief Justice Roberts 
provided a test for inmates proposing alternative execution procedures: 
To qualify, the alternative procedure must be feasible, readily implemented, and 
in fact significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.  If a State refuses to 
adopt such an alternative in the face of these documented advantages, without a 
legitimate penological justification for adhering to its current method of 
execution, then a State’s refusal to change its method can be viewed as “cruel and 
unusual” under the Eighth Amendment.219 
 
The societal views on capital punishment serve as less of a factor because the Court has 
acknowledged the constitutionality of the capital punishment.  Instead, the burden rests on the 
inmate to demonstrate the procedure is unconstitutional by providing an alternative.  Moreover, 
the inmate must show a refusal on the part of the State to change the procedures.  By focusing on 
the procedures, the capital punishment inquiry does not address the larger constitutional question 
of capital punishment itself.  Nevertheless, access to information still plays an important role.  In 
order for the inmate to challenge the constitutionality of the death penalty procedure or to 
propose a different procedure, the inmate must first know all the facts of the State’s death 
penalty procedures.  While public opinion is not an important factor in Chief Justice Robert’s 
analysis, information and access to information remains at the center of any challenge to capital 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 
Part III 
 Of the various provisions contained in the First Amendment, the Right of Access finds its 
basis within the right of free speech.  In pertinent part, the Amendment provides: “Congress shall 
make no law… abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”220  The Constitution ensures 
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that the citizens retain sovereignty over the government; as such, the citizen needs information to 
make the best decisions.221  The First Amendment ensures that “[w]hen he decides an issue, he is 
entitled to information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that 
issue.”222  By ensuring the free flow of information to the citizenry, the Constitution provides for 
meaningful oversight of the government by the people and promotes accountability. 
 For a time, the Supreme Court flirted with finding a Right of Access to the courts 
inherent in the Sixth Amendment, which ensures the right to a “speedy and public trial.”223  The 
1948 Supreme Court case of In re Oliver224 involved the denial of an inmate’s habeas corpus 
petition by the Michigan State Supreme Court.  The inmate had been convicted of contempt of 
court during a judge-grand jury hearing.225  At the time, Michigan had in place a grand jury 
system in which a judge sat as the sole fact-finder.226  The secretive nature of the grand jury led 
to the inmate’s conviction for contempt of court behind closed doors without the benefit of 
counsel.227  The Supreme Court held that such a proceeding violated the inmate’s right to a 
public trial.228  The Court reasoned that the public trial serves “as a safeguard against any attempt 
to employ our courts as instruments of persecution.  The knowledge that every criminal trial is 
subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on 
possible abuse of judicial power.”229  Certain court proceedings could be held in chambers, but 
the majority of proceedings remained opened to the public.230  Although a court had great powers 
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to ensure the dignity of the court through contempt proceedings, the use of contempt still must 
abide by the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a public trial.231 
 While In re Oliver opened the door to a right to public court proceedings, Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale232 limited the Sixth Amendment’s application to the defendant alone.  During the 
pre-trial hearings of a murder case, local newspapers sought access to the court room to report on 
the proceedings.233  The Supreme Court upheld the denial of access to the press because 
“members of the public have no constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 
to attend criminal trials.”234  According to the Court, the public-trial guarantee of the Sixth 
Amendment attaches to the individual for his or her own benefit, rather than serving as some 
general public right.235  The defendant, and not a third party, must assert a Sixth Amendment 
public-trial claim.  By limiting the Sixth Amendment to the individual, the Court undercuts the 
power of the public to serve as “an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.”236  
Nevertheless, the Sixth Amendment does not stand for general rights, forcing litigants to find 
another means for ensuring government accountability within the criminal justice system. 
 One of the first inklings from the Supreme Court of any type of Right of Access came in 
the case Zemel v. Rusk.237  The majority denied the appellant’s visa application to visit Cuba, 
finding that “[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to 
gather information.”238  The government can restrict travel to both domestic and international 
areas if access “would directly and materially interfere with the safety and welfare of the area or 
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the nation as a whole.”239  Although the majority rejected the Right of Access argument, Justice 
Douglas, in his dissent, laid the basis from which later courts would construct a First 
Amendment Right of Access.  Justice Douglas explained his theory behind the First Amendment: 
The right to know, to converse with others, to consult with them, to observe 
social, physical, political and other phenomena abroad as at home gives meaning 
and substance to freedom of expression and freedom of press.  Without those 
contacts, First Amendment rights would suffer.240 
 
For the First Amendment to have any force, people must have access to the information.  
According to Justice Douglas access to the information and to different places permits the free 
flow of ideas.  Interesting to note, in the first iteration, the right of access theory has little to do 
with government oversight, but the general First Amendment idea of the marketplace of ideas. 
 During the 1970s, the Supreme Court issued a series of opinions pertaining to the limits 
of a prisoner’s First Amendment rights.  In two cases decided on the same day,241 the Court 
deferred to prison administrators’ experience when regulations touch upon inmates’ First 
Amendment rights.  In Pell v. Procunier, the Court upheld regulations that denied reporters 
interviews with inmates of their choice.242  The Court’s inquiry began with the proposition that 
inmates retain “those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with [their status as 
prisoners] or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.”243  Thus, 
Courts must perform a balancing test in determining the constitutionality of prison regulations 
that impede prisoner contact.  The Court reasoned that: 
Institutional considerations, such as security and related administrative problems 
as well as the accepted and legitimate policy objectives of the corrections system 
itself, require that some limitations be placed on [visitations to prisoners].  So 
long as reasonable and effective means of communication remain open and no 
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discrimination in terms of content is involved, we believe that in drawing such 
lines prison officials must be accorded latitude.244 
 
Since the prison officials permitted the prisoners to communicate to outside sources through 
letters, the Court held the regulations did not violate the First Amendment rights of the 
prisoners.245  In response to the claims brought by newspaper reporters requesting access to the 
prisoners, however, the Court held that “[n]ewsmen have no constitutional right of access to 
prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public… The Constitution does not 
require government to accord the press special access to information not shared by members of 
the public generally.”246  The Court reiterated this view in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.  The 
Court reasoned that because the prison policy in question did not deny access to information 
available to the general public, the regulations did not infringe upon the First Amendment.247 
 The two companion cases were announced with two separate dissents.  In his Pell dissent, 
Justice Douglas argued for a right of access for the press to gather information from inmates.248  
While he accepted the majority’s balancing test, Justice Douglas did not believe the interest in 
prison discipline permitted the blanket ban on interviews to reporters.249  Justice Douglas also 
advocated for a reading of the Free Press Clause based upon the public need for information 
about public institutions and the press as the means by which the public will receive that 
information.250  In particular, Justice Douglas noted: “Prisons… are ultimately the responsibility 
of the populace.  Crime… is a matter of grave concern in our society and our people have a right 
and the necessity to know not only of the incidence of crime but of the effectiveness of the 
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system designed to control it.”251  The press needs access to the information in order to fulfill its 
duty to ensure an informed public.  In his Saxbe dissent, Justice Powell further explained the role 
of the press within the First Amendment: “The underlying right is the right of the public 
generally.  The press is the necessary representative of the public’s interest in this contest and the 
instrumentality which effects the public’s right.”252  Although neither Justice Douglas nor Justice 
Powell explicitly found a public right of access within the First Amendment, their dissents 
definitely recognize the special relationship the press has with the public.  For an informed 
public to participate in the democratic process, the public needs access to information about the 
government.  Through the press, the public receives the information necessary to make informed 
decisions.  Therefore, the press needs access to government information not accessible to the 
general public. 
 Four years later, the Supreme Court decided Houchins v. KQED, Inc.253 which arose from 
attempts by reporters to gain access to prisoners.  After the suicide of an inmate at a county jail, 
the local television station sought to inspect and take pictures of the facility.254  When prison 
officials refused, the television station brought a First Amendment claim.255  The Court 
eventually rejected the claim, finding that “[n]either the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth 
Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of information 
within the government’s control… the media have no special right of access… different from or 
greater than that accorded the public generally.”256  The Court did recognize the important place 
the media has in American society.  “[A]cting as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the public, they can be a 
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powerful and constructive force, contributing to remedial action in the conduct of public 
business.”257  However, the Court did not recognize the existence of any First Amendment Right 
of Access.  While the media could help to inform the public, reporters did not necessarily have to 
rely on their own inspection of the prisons or interviews of prisoners.  The public had access to 
information through communications inmates had with family members as well as citizen task 
forces, which inspected the facilities.258 
 In his dissent, Justice Stevens offered a wider reading of the First Amendment.  
According to Justice Stevens, the First Amendment, at its core, protects the free exchange of 
information.259  As such, the First Amendment has a dual purpose, protecting “not only the 
dissemination but also the receipt of information and ideas.260  Moreover, the free flow of 
information ensures the success of the American democratic system predicated upon “the 
existence of an informed citizenry.”261   Justice Stevens argued: “Without some protection for the 
acquisition of information about the operation of public institutions such as prisons by the public 
at large, the process of self-governance contemplated by the Framers would be stripped of all its 
substance.”262  With access to information about the prisons, the public can better oversee its 
governments.  Here, Justice Stevens ties the First Amendment to the notion of public oversight 
of the government.  The access to information enables the public to better assert its constitutional 
rights in the face of government violations.  Constitutional rights do not disappear once 
individuals are imprisoned.  Justice Stevens noted: 
While a ward of the State and subject to its stern discipline, he retains 
constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment… a protection 
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which may derive more practical support from access to information about 
prisons by the public than by occasional litigation in a busy court.263 
 
Using Justice Stevens’ reasoning, the First Amendment becomes an important tool in the 
public’s duty to oversee the government.  Through access to information, the public can ensure 
the government does not infringe upon the rights of even the least politically powerful.   
 With the plurality decision of Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,264 the Supreme Court 
found a public right of access to government proceedings within the First Amendment.  During a 
high profile murder trial, the judge had closed his courtroom to the public.265  In response, the 
local newspaper sued to reopen the trial.266  After stressing the traditionally public nature of trials 
in the United States, Chief Justice Burger described the First Amendment as a means to ensure 
government accountability.  The various provisions of the First Amendment “share a common 
core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of 
government.”267   The press relates the events of a trial to the people, alerting the people to 
miscarriages of justice.  Although the First Amendment makes no explicit mention of the Right 
of Access, to permit the government to limit access to proceedings would undermine the concept 
of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.268 
 Perhaps the more important opinion issued in Richmond Newspapers came from Justice 
Brennan.  While the Chief Justice proclaimed a First Amendment Right of Access, he noted the 
government could limit access provided “an overriding interest” existed.269  Justice Brennan 
described a test for when the government could limit public access.  According to Justice 
Brennan, the First Amendment “has a structural play in securing and fostering our republican 
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system of self-government.”270  Because of the structural role of the First Amendment, the 
government may not interfere with “meaningful communication” that informs the public.271  In 
deciding Right of Access cases, Justice Brennan offered a two part test.  First, courts should 
consider whether there exists “an enduring and vital tradition of public entree to particular 
proceedings or information.”272  Next, courts should consider “whether access to a particular 
government process is important in terms of that very process.”273  In the context of Richmond 
Newspapers, Justice Brennan noted the long history of public trials.274  Under the second prong, 
Justice Brennan noted the important role open trials serve “in furthering the efforts of our 
judicial system to assure the criminal defendant a fair and accurate adjudication of guilt or 
innocence.”275  Denying access to the trial undermines the entire legal system.  Justice Brennan 
wrote: 
Secrecy is profoundly inimical to this demonstrative purpose of the trial process.  
Open trial assure the public that procedural rights are respected, and that justice is 
afforded equally.  Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbitrariness, 
which in turn spawns disrespect for law.  Public access is essential, therefore, if 
trial adjudication is to achieve the objective of maintaining public confidence in 
the administration of justice.276 
 
Using his test, Justice Brennan found that trials should be open to the public.  Of more 
importance, Justice Brennan provided a method of analysis with farther reaching application.  
Although Chief Justice Burger relied heavily upon the tradition of public trials to justify a Right 
of Access, Justice Brennan looks beyond, accepting the Right of Access as a given and then 
moving to define the Right’s limits.   
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Two years later, the Court adopted Justice Brennan’s test in Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Superior Court.277  However, Justice Brennan noted the limited nature of the Right of Access.278  
The State must provide “weighty” justifications for limiting access.279  Specifically, to deny 
access, the State must show that “denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, 
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”280  Globe Newspaper Co. involved a 
Massachusetts statute that limited access to all trials involving the rape of minors.281  The State 
argued that the statute protected minors from further trauma.282  While the reason provided by 
the State had some merit, the Court found that the statute in question went too far because of its 
mandatory application.283  The Right of Access may have limitations, but the State has a heavy 
burden if it seeks to limit that right.  
Throughout the Right of Access line of cases, the Court never explicitly dealt with public 
access to the execution itself.  That is not to say that the Supreme Court has never had the 
opportunity to address the issue.  In 1890, the Supreme Court considered Minnesota’s execution 
authorization statute in Holden v. Minnesota.284  The statute limited the means of execution to 
hanging “within the walls of the jail” or “within an enclosure which shall be higher than the 
gallows, and shall exclude the view of persons outside.”285  The statute permitted the presence of 
select witnesses provided “no person so admitted shall be a newspaper reporter or 
representative.”286  Moreover, newspapers could not publish an account of the execution “beyond 
the statement of the fact that such convict was on the day in question duly executed according to 
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law.”287  Such restrictions would seem incongruous with First Amendment principles; however, 
the challenge to the statute focused on whether a section imposing a period of solitary 
confinement upon the prisoner prior to his or her execution violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.288  
Nevertheless, the Court upheld the statute because “it only prescribed the hour of the day before 
which, and the manner in which, the punishment of hanging shall be inflicted.”289  The Court 
then proceeded to find the other regulations of the statute constitutional: 
Whether a convict, sentenced to death, shall be executed before or after sunrise, or 
within or without the walls of the jail, or within or outside of some other 
enclosure, and whether the enclosure within which he is executed shall be higher 
than the gallows, thus excluding the views of persons outside, are regulations that 
do not affect his substantial rights.  The same observation may be made touching 
the restriction… as to the number and character of those who may witness the 
execution, and the exclusion altogether of reporters or representatives of 
newspapers.  These are regulations which the legislature, in its wisdom, and for 
the public good, could legally prescribe in respect to executions occurring after 
the passage of the act…290 
 
While upholding the statute, the Court does not even consider the First Amendment implications 
of private executions.  Indeed, the entire concept of a Right of Access has yet to enter into the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  Although the Court validates private execution statutes, the 
Court does so in passing.  The Court has since never broached the concept of private execution 
laws nor has the Court overturned Holden.  However, the case’s applicability to any Right of 
Access challenge to modern execution procedures would seem miniscule in light of more recent 
Supreme Court cases—most notably the analysis adopted by the Court in Globe Newspaper Co. 
Part IV 
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 Two recent lower court decisions addressed the connection between the First Amendment 
Right of Access and the Eighth Amendment: In re Lombardi291 and Schad v. Brewer.292  This 
section will begin with a brief reiteration of the drug shortages facing states.  Next, the section 
will explore the litigation tactics used by the inmates and the varying degree of success the 
inmates have had.  The final section will argue for the extension of the Right of Access to the 
protocols surrounding capital punishment. 
 In recent years, death penalty states have had difficulty procuring the drugs traditionally 
used in lethal injection procedures.  The European manufacturers of the drugs have stopped 
manufacturing the drugs in an effort to curtail the supply in the United States.  Consequently, 
states have had to turn to alternative methods to either acquire the drugs or to carry out the lethal 
injection procedure.  Some states have resorted to using compound pharmacists to manufacture 
the necessary drugs.  Other states have used more questionable methods to import the drugs.  The 
end result has been the same for each state: a shortage in the supply of the lethal injection drugs. 
 As states have struggled to acquire the drugs, they have also become less transparent with 
regards to lethal injection procedures.  In particular, states have sought to shield the public from 
information about the sources of the drugs.  Missouri and Arizona have similar provisions to 
limit access to information about the execution procedures.  Specifically, states shield the 
identities of the executioners, as defined by the state.  In the face of drug shortages, states have 
sought to expand the definition of the executioner.  Defendants have responded, with varying 
success, with new tactics to acquire shielded information. 
A. In re Lombardi 
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Missouri’s death penalty statute grants discretion to the Director of the Missouri 
Department of Corrections to devise the lethal injection protocol.293  The Director also chooses 
the members of the “execution team” comprised of “those persons who administer lethal gas or 
lethal chemicals and those persons such as medical personnel, who provide direct support for the 
administration of lethal injection chemicals.”294  The chosen execution protocol “that directly 
relates to the administration of … lethal chemicals” remains open to the public.295  However, 
other elements of the execution remain confidential, such as the “identities of members of the 
execution team” and execution protocols not directly related to the actual administration of the 
drugs.296 
In response to the dwindling supply of lethal injection drugs, Missouri’s Director “issued 
a new execution protocol in May 2012 that called for the injection of two grams of propofol.”297  
However, the Director abandoned the use of propofol in October 2013 because its use as an 
anesthetic in surgical procedures could be jeopardized by resulting European Union trade 
restrictions.298  Consequently, Missouri adopted new procedures that replaced propofol with 
pentobaribital.299  Missouri also added the compound pharmacy responsible for providing the 
pentobaribital to the execution team.300 
In 2012, death row inmates in Missouri sued the Director alleging that the new protocol 
violated the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause.301  After Missouri 
revised its lethal injection protocol, the inmates filed an amended complaint on December 3, 
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2013, challenging “the current protocol and the use of pentobarbital.”302  The district court issued 
a discovery order that required “the Director to disclose to counsel for the plaintiffs… the 
identities of the physician who provides a prescription for the compounded pentobarbital, the 
pharmacist who compounds the pentobarbital used in executions, and the laboratory that tests the 
compounded drug.”303  The district court asked the inmates’ attorneys to keep the information 
“confidential ‘other than as needed to do the investigation.’”304  The plaintiffs sought to use the 
discovery to possibly form the basis of an Eighth Amendment claim, believing that the use of 
pentobarbital from a compounding pharmacy “creates a substantial risk of severe pain or an 
objectively intolerable risk of severe pain.”305 
The Director sought a writ of mandamus from the Eighth Circuit to stop the district court 
from enforcing the discovery orders.306  A three-judge panel granted the writ in part, prohibiting 
the disclosure of the prescribing physician’s identity.307  However, the Director still needed to 
disclose “the identities of the compounding pharmacy and the testing laboratory.”308  The Eighth 
Circuit then granted a rehearing en banc.309 
The Director put forth two reasons to deny the inmates access to the requested 
information.  First, the Director argued that the information was protected by Missouri statute.310  
Specifically, by declaring the compounding pharmacy and testing laboratory members of the 
execution team, the identities fell under the Missouri execution statute, which ensures the 
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confidentiality of members of the execution team.311  Second, the Director asserted that the 
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim in the underlying litigation.312  The plaintiffs did not provide 
enough information in their Eighth Amendment complaint to support their claim; therefore, the 
district court should not have granted discovery, but should have dismissed the claim.313  The 
Director also feared that disclosure of the information could lead to “collateral consequences” 
that would prevent future acquisition of lethal injection drugs.314  If known to the public, 
compounding pharmacies might succumb to outside pressure and no longer sell drugs to the 
government.315 
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Director’s argument that the inmates lacked a claim 
that could withstand a motion to dismiss.  The plaintiffs failed to show that “the risk of harm 
arising from the State’s current lethal-injection protocol is substantial when compared to known 
and available alternatives.”  Relying on Baze v. Rees, the Court stated: 
Where, as here, there is no assertion that the State acts purposefully to inflict 
unnecessary pain in the execution process, the Supreme Court recognized only a 
limited right under the Eighth Amendment to require the State to change from one 
feasible method of execution to another. 
… 
Without a plausible allegation of a feasible and more humane alternative method 
of execution, or a purposeful design by the State to inflict unnecessary pain, the 
plaintiffs have not stated an Eighth Amendment claim based on the use of 
compounded pentobarbital.316 
 
The inmates had hoped to use the information acquired through discovery to support their Eighth 
Amendment claims.  Without the identity of the compounding pharmacy, the inmates could not 
research and ensure the safety of the drugs to be administered during the lethal injection.  Caught 
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in a Catch-22, the inmates’ claim failed because it did not have the information it sought to 
acquire in discovery.  Ultimately, In re Lombardi shows the difficulty in not only succeeding on 
but also proceeding to discovery of an Eighth Amendment claim without access to all the 
information concerning the execution protocols.  An Eighth Amendment claim by itself does not 
gain the plaintiff access to the execution protocols the state seeks to keep private. 
B. Schad v. Brewer 
Like Missouri, Arizona’s death penalty statute gives the state department of corrections 
leeway in determining the protocols.  The statute limits the method of execution to lethal 
injection, but does not define the drugs to be used.317  As such, the Arizona Department of 
Corrections makes the ultimate decision on the exact drugs for the execution.  Arizona’s death 
penalty statute also keeps the identity of the executioner out of the public domain:   
The identity of executioners and other persons who participate or perform 
ancillary functions in an execution and any information contained in records that 
would identify persons is confidential and is not subject to disclosure…318 
 
 Two Arizona death row inmates filed a complaint against the governor of Arizona, the 
director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, and their respective wardens.319  The inmates 
hoped to receive an injunction from the district court requiring the defendants to disclose the 
information about the lethal injection drugs.320  Specifically, the inmates requested to know: 
a. The manufacturer of lethal-injection drugs 
b. The NDCs of lethal-injection drugs 
c. The lot numbers of lethal-injection drugs 
d. The expiration dates of lethal-injection drugs 
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e. Documentation indicating that those who will handle pentobarbital or other 
controlled substances in the execution have the appropriate DEA authorization 
to do so.321 
 
Of particular interest, the inmates did not claim any Eighth Amendment violation, but sought the 
information under alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendment.322  Unlike the 
plaintiffs from In re Lombardi, the plaintiffs did not claim a breach of the Eighth Amendment.  
Rather than seek the information through discovery, the plaintiffs in Schad v. Brewer made the 
lack of information the basis of their claim. 
 The plaintiffs had attempted to receive the information outside of litigation.  Lawyers for 
the plaintiffs wrote two letters over the summer of 2013 requesting information about the lethal 
injection protocols.323  The plaintiffs hoped to learn “the name of the manufacturer of the drug, 
the brand name of the drug, the expiration date, whether the drug is compounded, and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration registrations authorizing the execution team members to handle 
controlled substances.”324  The State refused to provide the name of the manufacturer or the 
source of the drug, citing the A.R.S. §13-757(C) and its prohibition on the revelation of the 
identity of execution team members.325  A public records request by the American Civil Liberties 
Union of Arizona succeeded in obtaining “a highly redacted document regarding the acquisition 
of the execution drugs,” revealing “only that the drug is Nembutal® that was purchased 
sometime in 2011.”326 
 The conflict surrounding the drug information stemmed from plaintiffs’ perceptions that 
Arizona may either not have acquired the drug properly or would use expired drugs.  Plaintiffs 
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cited Cook v. FDA327 in which the DC Circuit found that the FDA had permitted Arizona, 
California, and Tennessee to import lethal injection drugs in violation of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act.  At one execution, Arizona had discovered that the drugs to be used had 
expired.328  In fact, the plaintiffs alleged that the state’s stockpile of pentobarbital, comprised of 
Nembutal®, had expired in March 2013.329  The manufacturer of Nembutal® no longer sold the 
drug to departments of corrections, leaving Arizona without a source to acquire the drug 
legitimately.330 
 Plaintiffs’ arguments focused on Arizona’s attempts to conceal the requested information 
from the public.  First, plaintiffs attempted to establish a right to the information under the First 
Amendment.331  According to the plaintiffs, the lack of information leaves plaintiffs “unable to 
vindicate any potential Eight Amendment claim that they may have.”332  For their First 
Amendment claim, the plaintiffs relied upon California First Amendment Coalition v. 
Woodford,333 which recognized a public “right to be informed about how the State and its justice 
system implement the most serious punishment a state can exact from a criminal defendant—the 
penalty of death.”334  In furtherance of their argument, the plaintiffs noted that Arizona had 
previously provided similar information in past public-records proceedings.335  Second, the 
plaintiffs claimed that the denial of access to the information “violates their right to due process 
and meaningful access to the courts by preventing them from discovering whether they have a 
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colorable claim that their executions will be carried out in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.”336 
 Defendants countered by doubting the ability of the plaintiffs to make an eventual Eighth 
Amendment claim.337  Moreover, defendants relied again upon Arizona’s execution statute 
which prohibits the disclosure of the executioner’s identity.338  Under the defendant’s arguments, 
the drug manufacturers fell under the definition of a “person” for whom the death penalty statute 
required confidentiality.339  Defendants also argued that by revealing the information, the sources 
of the drugs may become subject to public pressure and attacks.340  If the information were to 
become well-known, the state could find it even more difficult to maintain a supply of lethal 
injection drugs.341 
 The district court rejected the inmates’ due process claim. The court reasoned that the 
plaintiffs could not show an actual injury:  “Because Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right 
to assess whether they have [an Eighth Amendment] claim, they have failed to state a claim for 
denial of access to the courts in violation of their due process rights.”342  However, the court did 
accept the First Amendment claim.  Relying on California First Amendment Coalition, the 
district court found a public right of access under the First Amendment to the drug information 
“because there is both an historical tradition with public access to information about the means 
of executions and a public importance of public access to that information.”343  Having found a 
right to access the information, the Court then determined that Arizona’s attempts to deny access 
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to the information lacked a rational relationship to a legitimate penological interest.344  The court 
found the defendants’ concerns of possible public backlash to be speculative.345  Moreover, some 
requested information, such as the drug expiration date, lot number, or National Drug Code, 
would not reveal the manufacturer’s identity.346  In granting plaintiffs’ motion, the court did not 
require Arizona to provide all the requested information, for fear of disclosing the executioner’s 
identity.  Instead, the court ordered the state to disclose: 
a. The manufacturer of lethal injection drugs; 
b. The NDCs of lethal-injection drugs; 
c. The lot numbers of lethal-injection drugs; 
d. The expiration dates of lethal-injection drugs.347 
 
The decision in Schad v. Brewer provides an interesting new twist in death penalty 
litigation.  As the Schad court implied in rejecting the due process claim, discovery is not a right 
for plaintiffs.  In order to succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim, plaintiffs must have all of the 
information prior to filing their complaint for any chance at moving onto the discovery stage of 
litigation.  When the state appears uncooperative in granting access to lethal injection protocols, 
the response should not be grounded in an Eighth Amendment claim.  Plaintiffs’ claim would 
most likely not survive a motion for dismissal.  Rather, the plaintiffs should look to the First 
Amendment as a sword.  Through a right of access claim, the plaintiffs can acquire the 
information needed to then bring forth an Eighth Amendment claim with a better potential for 
success.  Of course, plaintiffs would need to move quickly in the face of possible executions; 
however, temporary stays would provide a means of delaying executions. 
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After the decision in Schad v. Brewer, the defendants provided the plaintiffs with the 
requested information.348  Ultimately, the information could not form the basis of an Eighth 
Amendment claim and both plaintiffs were executed.349 
C. The Future of Right of Access 
Both the public and the condemned inmate have an interest in knowing the exact 
procedures used in implementing the death penalty.  As such the Right of Access should extend 
to the state execution protocols, albeit for different reasons.  In terms of the public, society has an 
interest in seeing that when the State implements the most severe punishment, the State does so 
in keeping with Eighth Amendment principles.  Similarly, the condemned individual has an 
interest in knowing that when the State executes him or her the State does so humanely.  The 
idea of the individual right admittedly is a more nuanced argument and rests less upon extension 
of Supreme Court precedent and more upon general ideas of morality.  In both instances, the 
Right of Access should be extended to include all information pertaining to executions. 
A public Right of Access to execution information is an extension of the Richmond-
Globe theory of court access.  Although the Court denied a Right of Access under the Sixth 
Amendment, the test articulated by the Court in Globe clearly finds a Right of Access an integral 
part of the First Amendment.  Applying the Globe test to execution protocols, the argument for 
public access to the information becomes more compelling.  First, a long history of public access 
to executions has existed.  True, for the last one hundred-fifty years the states have curtailed the 
public’s ability to view executions in the open.  However, the public still had access to the 
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information as to how the executions took place.  Although the hangings of Minnesota occurred 
behind closed doors, the public still knew that the state would use the simple rope and gallows to 
execute a condemned person.  Similarly, as New York prepared to implement the first execution 
via electrocution, newspaper articles provided the pubic with detailed accounts of exactly how 
the execution would occur.  In terms of lethal injections, only in the past few years have states 
sought to curtail public access to the information surrounding the implementation of the 
execution.  The details surrounding execution procedures have traditionally been open to the 
public.  Under the second prong of the Globe test, access to lethal injection protocols would 
seem important to ensure that State executes individuals in a manner consistent with Eighth 
Amendment principles.  As the Court noted when deciding trial access cases, public access to 
execution procedures would ensure the constitutionality of the proceeding and maintain public 
confidence in capital punishment. 
Of course a fundamental difference exists between the trial and the implementation of 
punishment.  The Court has consistently deferred to prison officials in cases that challenged 
regulations restricting public access to prisoners.  However, a key difference exists between such 
regulations and the denial of information concerning execution protocols.  In seeking access to 
the execution protocols, the public does not attempt to conduct interviews with selected prisoners 
nor does it attempt to film segments of the prison.  The public seeks general information from the 
prison officials as to how a government proceeding, perhaps the most grave proceeding, is to be 
conducted.  In each of the prison access cases, the Court also noted the ability of the public to 
obtain the information through other means—citizens committees, prison mail to family 
members.  State secrecy surrounding execution protocols provides no alternative means for the 
public to know the details of the execution itself.  Prisoners cannot write letters to family 
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members detailing how the state procured the drugs because the state does not provide access to 
the information.  Unlike prison conditions, the lethal injection protocols are not readily 
observable and capable of dissemination to outside sources by prisoners because the states refuse 
to provide the information. 
Courts confronted with demands for the information pertaining to the acquisition of lethal 
injection drugs have discussed the interest the State has in maintaining the secrecy of the 
executioner.  Most notably, Chief Judge Kozinski in Landrigan v. Brewer350 argued that states 
should protect the drug manufacturers from potential public attacks.351  Chief Judge Kozinski 
also seems to accept the need to protect European suppliers from criminal investigations under 
the European Union:  
Indeed, Arizona had good reasons not to [provide the name of the drug 
manufacturer]; just twenty-four hours after the state attorney general conceded the 
drug was imported from Great Britain, one journalist suggested the company 
might be criminally liable under an EU regulation that makes it illegal to “trade in 
certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture, or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.”352 
 
Such arguments not only seem to condone the violation of the laws of other jurisdictions but 
also, and more importantly, fail to appreciate the role of the public in the Eighth Amendment’s 
evolution.  If the public expresses displeasure with a company’s provisioning of the State with 
lethal injection drugs, the public does so as a showing of the evolving standards of decency.  If a 
company chooses to respect public concerns and abstain from lethal injection proceedings, it 
does so of its own volition. 
 The First Amendment Right of Access provides the means through which society can 
properly evaluate the evolving standards of decency integral to the Eighth Amendment.  As the 
                                                 
350 625 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010) (dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
351 Id. at 1143. 
352 Id. 
54 
 
Right of Access gives substance to the Freedom of the Press Clause, so too does it provide 
substance for the Eighth Amendment.  Society cannot accurately judge the humaneness of 
current punishments if it lacks all the information required to do so.  By keeping various death 
penalty protocols secret, states keep arguments about the constitutionality of lethal injections and 
the death penalty as a whole limited.  The Right of Access enables the public to receive 
information concerning government proceedings.  The free access to all of the information 
concerning execution proceedings ensures a true discussion of whether current practices remain 
constitutional in light of evolving standards of decency.   
When considering whether an individual inmate should be able to assert the Right of 
Access on his or her own behalf, one must look beyond the societal benefits of the right.  True, 
the individual can gain information that will then become subject to public scrutiny through the 
open courts.  However, something more fundamental should compel the State to provide the 
inmate with all information surrounding the execution process, especially when the information 
directly pertains to the exact method employed to end the inmate’s life.  The inmate cannot 
ensure the constitutionality of the punishment if he or she does not know the details of the 
method itself.  Such secrecy seems contrary to fundamental understandings of morality and 
fairness within the punishment stage of the criminal justice system.  The individual should know 
the details of the punishment that the state will impose upon him or her.  When the individual 
receives a sentence of a term of imprisonment, the individual can observe the conditions once 
inside the prison and report upon them.  Executions do not have such benefits.  Once the 
punishment has been administered, a life ends.  Therefore, it is incumbent upon the state to 
provide the information in advance. 
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Extending the Right of Access to include all information concerning executions does not 
come without some limits.  For the public, the right would not extend to include access to watch 
the execution.  Rather, the right would simply require states to disclose the details of the 
execution protocols.  Likewise, the individual prisoner would have a right to know the means by 
which the state will execute him, but not necessarily to broadcast the execution or invite 
unlimited guests to view the execution.  Such limits take into account the states’ interests in 
maintaining order within prisons and are in keeping with the Supreme Court prison access cases 
of the 1970s. 
Conclusion 
 This article does not seek to argue against the constitutionality of the death penalty, nor 
does it seek to delve into the morality of such a punishment.  It seeks to shed light on a potential 
new frontier for death penalty litigation—First Amendment Right of Access.  Current state 
government practices have attempted to obscure from the public the means by which inmates are 
executed.  By using a First Amendment claim, inmates can combat state obfuscation and perhaps 
gain access to information that could form the basis of an Eighth Amendment claim. 
 Justice Marshall theorized that if the public had all the information concerning the 
application and administration of capital punishment, a majority of the public would reject the 
punishment.  State attempts to keep the protocols surrounding executions outside the public 
domain make it difficult to test Justice Marshall’s theory.  A Gallup poll released in October 
2013 showed the lowest support for the death penalty in forty years at sixty percent in favor of 
the punishment.353  However, in that same poll, fifty-two percent of Americans believed the 
death penalty is applied fairly and forty percent thought the death penalty was applied 
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unfairly.354  The numbers from the polls come when states have actively sought to shield from 
the public the exact details of how an inmate is put to death. 
 The basis of the Eighth Amendment, the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society, is meaningless unless the standards are permitted to evolve.  To 
do so, society must have access to information, hence, the importance of a First Amendment 
Right of Access.  Once the information is available, the citizenry can make a fully informed 
decision.  In the interim, inmates should be able to use the Right of Access as a means to 
circumvent the limitations presented by state attempts to keep lethal injection protocols secret. 
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